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Abstract  This paper chronicles rent-seeking in the U.S. Atlantic sea scallop
fishery, including its influence on property rights formation. Decades of lobby-
ing by the U.S. fishing industry against foreign fishing and seafood imports
caused Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to 200 miles in 1977. Scallop
fishermen initially earned high profits for their efforts, but by about 1990 the
overcapitalized fishery was surviving on new year classes. Limited access and a
stock rebuilding program were introduced in 1994, but an asymmetric distribu-
tion of potential gains in favor of relatively few, multi-permit companies has
preoccupied public debate on the transferability and consolidation of fishing
rights. Rent-seeking by the limited-access permit holders is now also focused on
claims by the growing open-access sector of the scallop fishery, groundfish
bycatch limitations, and gear-induced habitat damage, which has drawn law-
suits from environmental organizations.
Key words  Property rights, rent-seeking, sea scallop fishery.
Introduction
The slow appearance of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in fisheries can be
puzzling because of their ability to limit common pool losses. In the United States,
where few fisheries have ITQs, most highly valued fishery resources were depleted
at some point by excess harvesting capacity, which developed after extended juris-
diction was implemented in1977. ITQs in the Mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery and the
Alaska Pacific halibut fishery were not adopted until fishing times contracted to absurd
levels. The U.S. Congress recently extended its 1996 moratorium on ITQs until 2003 to
give interested parties time to design restrictions and guidelines for future use.
Resistance to ITQs can be due to the distributional implications of new property
rights systems and to the high transaction costs of political negotiations when par-
ties, including regulators, are numerous and heterogeneous (Johnson and Libecap
1982; Libecap 1989). Competing rent-seekers expend resources to build political
support to either maintain or change status quo arrangements, including protecting
or reversing recent changes. Libecap (1989) predicted that resources would be de-
pleted before heterogeneous fisheries could negotiate ITQs.
The economics literature generally characterizes rent-seeking as an unproductive
use of scarce resources designed to persuade government officials to create artificial
scarcities in markets by assigning licenses, quotas, permits, or other entitlements
(Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock 1980; Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock 1988). Yet, rent-
seeking could increase wealth in natural resource sectors if the reductions in common
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pool losses or externalities outweigh rent-seeking costs (Buchanan 1980). Property
rights assignments underlie the rent-seeking process (Benson 1984; Buchanan 1980).
This paper chronicles rent-seeking in the U.S. Atlantic sea scallop fishery (scal-
lop fishery), including its influence on property rights formation. Although recom-
mended because the fishery primarily targets a single, sessile species (Sutinen et al.
1992), ITQs have been shunned by most scallopers and managers. The next section
describes the history of the scallop fishery and its management. This is followed by
sections which examine important aspects of rent-seeking in chronological order:
rent-capture after successfully lobbying for extended jurisdiction; differences over
transferable use rights due to asymmetric potential gains; and competition with the
growing open-access scallop sector and with the groundfish fishery and environ-
mental organizations, all mingled by spillover effects caused by scallop gear. The
paper ends by commenting on related histories in other fisheries.
History and Management of the Scallop Fishery
The Atlantic sea scallop (Placopecten magellanicus) is a bivalve mollusc distributed
throughout the Northeast Continental Shelf in the Northwest Atlantic Ocean be-
tween the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Canada, and Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, in the
U.S. (Serchuk et al. 1979). Scallops are concentrated on Georges Bank off of New
England and the Canadian Maritimes, the Mid-Atlantic (New York to North Caro-
lina), and, to a significantly lesser degree, in the Gulf of Maine (figure 1). The mar-
ketable “meat” (i.e., the adductor muscle attached to both shells) quadruples in size
between ages three, when scallops recruit to the fishery, and five. Yield-per-recruit
is maximized at about age seven. Losses in yield due to premature harvest are exac-
erbated by prices, which increase with meat size.
Commercial fishing for scallops dates back to 1887, when a quarter million
pounds were harvested inshore in the Gulf of Maine by two-men crews on sailing
craft outfitted with one three-foot wide oyster dredge (O’Brien 1961). During the
next six decades, the fishery expanded in response to consumer demand and market-
ing, technological innovations in power and electronics, improved gear designs, and
strengthened materials (Smolowitz and Serchuk 1988). By the 1990s, the technology
of the large, tonnage class 3 (50–150 gross registered tons) and 4 (>150 tons) off-
shore scallop vessels peaked with 800+ horsepower engines, two dredges up to 15-
feet wide each, state-of-the-art electronics for navigation and communication, and
up to 14 crew who shucked catches on board. Reported landings peaked at nearly 38
million pounds during 1990 and 1991, but long-term potential yield is thought to be
about 20 million pounds.
Tension between the U.S. and Canada developed after the mid-1950s, when Ca-
nadian scallopers moved onto Georges Bank and showed interest in the Mid-Atlan-
tic. Between 1957 and 1977, U.S. landings from Georges Bank dropped from over
10 million pounds to well below 5 million pounds, while Canadian landings and ex-
ports to New England both increased from about 2 million pounds to over 25 million
pounds, lowering U.S. dockside prices.
Federal involvement in marine fisheries included the 1945 Truman Proclama-
tions on coastal and shelf resources and several international agreements and treaties
intended to appease vocal and diverse groups of fishermen and processors (Hollick
1978). Continued demands for federal resource and trade protections culminated in
1977 with the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (M-S
Act) and extended federal fisheries jurisdiction out to 200 miles from shore
(Magnuson 1977). The International Court in the Hague divided U.S. and Canadian
claims to Georges Bank in 1984.Rent-Seeking in the Scallop Fishery 265
The scallop fishery grew unregulated until 1982, when the New England Fish-
ery Management Council (NEFMC) implemented a minimum meat size standard
with the Sea Scallop Fishery Management Plan (Plan).1 The number of full-time
scallop vessels increased eight-fold between 1977 and 1993 (figure 2), including
construction of 152 new vessels during 1977–82 alone. Aggregate fishing effort in-
creased 500%. The fishery depended on premature harvest of small recruits to sur-
vive financially. The meat size standard was doomed by seasonal variations in meat
size, on-board soaking, and inadequate dockside inspections.
Figure 1.  Closed Groundfish and Sea Scallop Management
Areas in the U.S. Northeast Region
Note: Circles show scallop distribution on Georges Bank and the Mid-Atlantic.
EEZ is the 200-mile extended economic zone. Latitude is north, and longitude is west.
1 Contact the author for citations to the numerous regulatory actions (plans, amendments, frameworks,
emergency, interim) and NMFS documents referred to in this paper. These are not referenced in order to
save space.Edwards 266
Amendment 4 to the Plan created a limited-access permit system in 1994 in the
Georges Bank and Mid-Atlantic fisheries. The 357 limited-access vessels were re-
stricted by a 7-man crew limit and allocated nontransferable days-at-sea effort quo-
tas depending on their full-time (264 vessels), part-time (62), or occasional (31) per-
mit category. Effort quotas were scheduled for nearly a 50% reduction over 6 years,
including up to 120 days in the predominant full-time category. The amendment also
retained open-access permits for small boats that targeted scallops inshore season-
ally, but restricted them with a 400-pound trip limit. Roughly 200 open-access boats
have landed less than a million pounds a year since 1994.
In December 1994, an Emergency Action taken by the Secretary of Commerce
and adopted by the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) closed
nearly 5,000 square-nautical miles of the shelf off New England to all gear capable
of catching groundfish. This was done in order to rebuild depleted stocks of Atlantic
cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder. Closed Areas I and II on Georges Bank and
the Nantucket Lightship Closed Area off southern New England (figure 1) previ-
ously yielded half of U.S. scallop landings from this region.
At its December 1997 meeting, the NEFMC rejected making effort quotas trans-
ferable, including allowing multi-vessel companies to consolidate their limited-ac-
cess permits. The NEFMC also adopted the Commerce Secretary’s April 1998 In-
terim Action closures of the Hudson Canyon and Virginia Beach areas in the Mid-
Atlantic (figure 1) to prevent premature harvest of small scallops. Together, the
three groundfish and two scallop closed areas encompassed one-third of the scallop
resource area on the shelf and, during 1998, 85% of the harvestable biomass.
This history covers a few phases of rent-seeking which are described below. The
first phase involves cashing in on successful lobbying for extended jurisdiction and
ultimately depleting the resource base. The second phase covers development of
limited access and disagreement about whether to make use rights transferable. Fi-
nally, the limited-access permit holders are now lobbying for permanent access to
the groundfish closed areas and protecting rents from the open-access sector and en-
vironmental organizations.
Figure 2.  Vessel Numbers, Effort (days-at-sea), and Swept-Area
Biomass (mt) in the U.S. Atlantic Sea Scallop FisheryRent-Seeking in the Scallop Fishery 267
Short-Term Gains Following Extended Jurisdiction
After the federal government assumed full ownership of fishery resource rights with
the M-S Act, it alienated management rights to regional councils of mostly govern-
ment and industry (commercial, recreational, environmental) stakeholders. It also
continued the de facto rights of fishermen to earn income from harvests and encour-
aged entry with vessel construction subsidies and favorable tax treatment. Although
clearly serving the U.S. fishing industry, this open policy also could have been a
cost-effective way for the federal government to enforce its claim against foreign
fishermen (Lueck 1998). Subsequent management plans mostly micromanage the
fishing industry with input and output regulations. However, regulations do not en-
tirely limit harvests, because monitoring and enforcement are costly (Libecap 1989).
Furthermore, regulations can redistribute benefits to politically powerful sectors in
heterogeneous fisheries (Karpoff 1987).
The short-term returns to rent-seeking afforded by extended jurisdiction were
estimated using an empirical version of Cheung’s (1970) model of rent dissipation.
Profit, π , in the scallop fishery was modeled as the owners’ 40% shares of gross
dockside revenue minus operating and fixed costs:
π  = 0.4[P(QGB-MA(D,B) + QGOM + MCAN) • QGB-MA(D,B)]
– [0.8 • pTC3 + pTC4] • [480D – 198,000 • [D/dFT]]
where P(•) is a market price function specified with total scallop supplies (domestic
landings, Q, from Georges Bank, the Mid-Atlantic, and the Gulf of Maine plus im-
ports, M, from Canada);2 QGB-MA(•) is an industry production function for the off-
shore Georges Bank and the Mid-Atlantic fishery; D is fishing effort (days at sea); B
is resource biomass;3 $480 is the average daily operating costs of tonnage class 4
vessels; and $198 thousand is the average fixed cost per tonnage class 4 vessel. The
pi are percentages of total fishing effort by tonnage class, and 0.8 is the relative size
of tonnage class 3 costs. dFT is average, annual effort by full-time vessels (assumed
as in Amendment 4 to be 150 days or more), making D/dFT the number of full-time-
equivalent vessels. All costs and prices are in real 1996 US$.
This simple profit model reflects data limitations as well as interest only in the mag-
nitude and trend in industry profit. The only available cost data were from a report by
Gautam and Kitts (1996), who compiled information from the federal income tax returns
of vessel owners who received NMFS Capital Construction Fund loans during 1984–93.
These data are from a non-random sample of 27 vessels in the fishery. Fixed costs do not
include mortgage expenses, because the majority of vessels in the scallop fishery are
paid for. The opportunity costs of vessel capital and owner-operators’ time are unknown.
Dockside price was estimated as a linear function of annual scallop supplies
during 1977–98 (n = 22) using the SAS GLS estimator:
P = 10.07 – 0.000000092 • (QGB-MA + QGOM + MCAN) – 1.656 • A4
(10.89) (–4.36) (–3.22)
2 NMFS in the Northeast Region collects landings data from vessels and first buyers. Import statistics
are from the Division of Economics and Statistics Division of NMFS in Silver Spring, Maryland.
3 Swept-area biomass was calculated from the biomass density indices for Georges Bank and the Mid-
Atlantic reported by the NEFSC in a stock assessment report. Weights per standardized tow of the
dredge were divided by the area of a standard tow (0.001526 square miles) and then multiplied by the
areas of Georges Bank and the Mid-Atlantic (7,456 and 8,427 square-miles, respectively). The results
for Georges Bank and the Mid-Atlantic were added.Edwards 268
where t-statistics are in parentheses (R2 = 0.58). Being the same species, scallops
from the Gulf and Maine and Canada are most likely perfect substitutes in process-
ing and consumption for U.S. offshore landings. The A4 dummy variable could re-
flect the influence of small scallops on average price, because Amendment 4 elimi-
nated the minimum meat size standard in 1995. Parameters are significant at the
0.99 level. Autocorrelation (DW = 1.73 from GLS model; critical value of upper
limit is 1.66 at 0.95 level) and heteroskedasticity (Glejster test: F = 0.36 < F(0.05),3,18
= 3.16) were not detected. Scallop (not sea scallop) imports from other countries
and disposable per-capita income were not significant at even the 0.90 level. Simul-
taneity between demand and supply (e.g., captains extend trips hoping to get better
prices) is a complex question that cannot be captured with aggregate annual data
from a fishery that was open-access until late 1994.
A Cobb-Douglas production function for landings was estimated using 1977–98
data:
ln(QGB-MA) = 8.361 + 0.707•ln(D) + 0.489•ln(B) – 0.200•A4
(5.96) (5.86) (4.94) (–1.82)
(R2 = 0.81). Here, A4 could represent the crew size constraint and exclusion from
closed areas. Effort and biomass are significant at the 0.99 level; A4 is significant at
the 0.90 level. Autocorrelation (DW = 1.91; critical value of upper limit is 1.66 at
the 0.95 level) and heteroskedasticity (F = 1.01 < F(0.05),3,18 = 3.16) were not found.
The average profit (AP) and marginal profit (MP) of industry fishing effort were
derived from the profit model and evaluated at values of D each year given pi, dFT,
B, MCAN, and QGOM. The average and marginal costs of fishing effort (including fixed
costs) are equal because costs are linear functions of effort; however, they varied be-
tween years depending on the number of vessels and pi. Values ranged between
$1,258 and $1,421 per day during 1977–93, but the decline in dFT after effort quotas
were introduced in 1994 increased daily costs to nearly $1,900.
Distributions around key inputs in the profit model were used to incorporate
variability. Values for costs were drawn from triangular distributions between one
standard deviation around the means. Predictions of price and production were aug-
mented by normal distributions around the estimated residuals. The estimates of AP
and MP, reported in figures 3 and 4, respectively, are means and standard deviations
from 100 Monte Carlo simulations using @RISK for Excel spreadsheets. Results for
1989 are missing due to unavailable biomass data for Georges Bank.
Profit declined throughout the study period, especially initially. AP (figure 3)
and MP (figure 4) were greatest in 1977, but by 1982 when the new Plan was imple-
mented to “maximize over time the joint social and economic benefits from the har-
vesting and use of the sea scallop resource” (their emphasis; NEFMC 1982, p. 74),
MP was consistently negative. These results are supported by a recent analysis of
technical harvest capacity in the fishery conducted by Kirkley et al. (2001), who re-
ported that 79 vessels could harvest the annual, long-term potential yield of 20 mil-
lion pounds. By 1982, there were 71 full-time vessels in the fishery, plus another
147 vessels that fished at lower levels of effort (figure 2). Over 100 of the current
limited-access vessels were constructed during 1977–79; another 50 were built dur-
ing 1980–82.
Biomass improved by 1990 due to above-average recruitment of new year
classes (figure 2). However, the fleet expanded and fishing effort doubled again. The
estimate of AP turned negative in 1993 due to high fixed costs and low biomass (fig-
ure 3). Owner-operators also receive a portion of the crew share, however.
The regulated reductions in effort during 1994–98 did not improve industry
profit, as most resource biomass was inside the closed groundfish and scallop areasRent-Seeking in the Scallop Fishery 269
Figure 3.  Average Profit per Day in the U.S.
Atlantic Sea Scallop Fishery, 1977–98.
Note: Values are mean and standard deviation (1996 US$/day)
(figures 3 and 4). Many scallopers remained active, despite poor returns, in order to
maintain their fishing history.
Rent-Seeking for Transferable Property Rights
Work on Amendment 4 to the Plan began in 1990 with public hearings on alterna-
tives to replace the meat count policy, which failed to rebuild scallop biomass. The
fishery evidently expanded to its open-access limit by then, with estimates of profit
per day averaging near zero (figure 3). New year classes were depleted within two
years of recruitment, thereby foregoing considerable future rents. Fishermen agreed
with NMFS that fishing effort should be curtailed in order to reduce fishing mortal-
ity to federally mandated levels; therefore, industry could accept limited access to
prevent future, new entrants from dissipating gains from stock rebuilding. The in-
dustry advisors committee voted against ITQs, however, because of the experienceEdwards 270
of the surf clam fishery in the region, where it took 13 years to negotiate shares after
limited access was implemented in 1977 (Wang 1995). Instead, they agreed to non-
transferable vessel effort quotas. Unlike ITQs, effort quotas are not absolute constraints
on production, and they preserve large differences in catch rates among vessels.4
The two sides to the transferability dispute formed organizations to promote
their objectives to the NEFMC and local members of the U.S. Congress, while
Amendment 7 was being designed during 1996–98 to implement the more strict cri-
terion of biological overfishing imposed by the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act
(SFA) amendment to the M-S Act. The new overfishing definition for scallops im-
plied substantial reductions in vessel effort quotas, insufficient to cover fixed costs
for most vessels; e.g., 51 days for full-time permits in 2001 and as few as 34 days in
2004 of the 10-year rebuilding plan.
4 Personal observations appearing throughout this paper were gained while attending numerous meetings
of management and technical committees.
Figure 4.  Marginal Profit per Day in the U.S.
Atlantic Sea Scallop Fishery, 1977–98.
Note: Values are mean and standard deviation (1996 US$/day)Rent-Seeking in the Scallop Fishery 271
Despite these plans to reduce effort, the 28-member Fishermen’s Ad Hoc Com-
mittee from the historically dominant scallop port of New Bedford, Massachusetts,
organized to block transferability. This organization lobbied for both a government-
financed vessel buyback program to reduce capital in the fishery, and a redistribu-
tion to active vessels of days not being used by the more than 40 latent permits,
which were mostly owned by multi-permit companies. Three-quarters of the
Fishermen’s Ad Hoc Committee’s members own either one, full-time scallop permit
or only dragger (groundfish) permits. A local attorney represents this organization.
In contrast, the approximately dozen members of the Scallop Group Inc. from
the top three ports in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Virginia own several permits
each. This organization lobbied for transferability, including consolidating permits
and effort quotas on fewer vessels. The Scallop Group Inc. hired a former council
member to be its executive director and representative due to his favorable stand on
transferability.
The distribution of costs and wealth in the fishery is the foremost issue for the
Fishermen’s Ad Hoc Committee, which prevailed when the NEFMC rejected trans-
ferability in 1997. Permit consolidation would favor members of the Sea Scallop
Group Inc. by reducing fixed costs and increasing each vessel’s technical efficiency
with more days. In contrast, the majority of scallopers in the fishery, including most
members of the Fishermen’s Ad Hoc Committee, would need to buy or lease more
days to become efficient. The new value of marketable effort quotas would also
strongly favor the Sea Scallop Group Inc.
The division between the two organizations can be appreciated by a closer look
at permit ownership, which was approximated from unique telephone numbers and
addresses reported by fishermen on their permit applications and from personal
knowledge of NMFS port agents. The 357 limited-access permits in 1999 were allo-
cated to an estimated 203 companies, including 147 companies that have 264 full-
time permits and account for about 95% of total scallop landings. Within the full-
time category, 101 companies owned one permit each, or 38% of all full-time per-
mits. Another 37 companies owned 2–5 permits each, or 35% of the total. In con-
trast, only 9 companies owned 6–10 permits each, which amounted to 27% of the
total. The range of potential marketable wealth among companies that own full-time
permits in the multi-million dollar fishery is as much as 10:1. In addition, each ves-
sel shed by a multi-permit company would save about $200 thousand a year in fixed
costs.
Permit concentration in the scallop fishery was measured with the Herfindahl
index, H = Σ si
2, where si is the share of total effort allocated to firm I. H approaches
1 either as the number of firms decreases or as ownership is distributed less evenly.
The prevalence of small firms in the scallop fishery is indicated by the small con-
centration index, H = 0.011.
This result and the scallop industry’s inability thus far to negotiate transferable
use rights — including ITQ shares while Amendments 4 and 7 were being developed
— is consistent with results reported by Libecap and Wiggins (1984) for oil lease
unitization (i.e., inter-firm consolidation of production) in Oklahoma and Texas dur-
ing 1926–35. Common pool losses in crude oil production resemble those in fisher-
ies in terms of costly overcapitalization of too many wells and surface storage con-
tainers and of premature dissipation of subsurface pressure which raises extraction
costs and lowers recovery rates. Total oil production and firm quotas were privately
contracted within two months at the field where there were only six firms and con-
centration was high (H = 0.53). In contrast, the failure to contract privately at the oil
field site where there were 147 firms and H = 0.017 led to state regulations which
were ignored by leaseholders, except during periods of martial law. The similarities
between the latter oil field and the scallop fishery are noteworthy.Edwards 272
Outside Parties and the Current Rent-Seeking Landscape
With the battle for transferability still ongoing, the SFA requirements to minimize
bycatch and habitat damage have engendered a “rent-seeking frenzy” found also on
land where multiple user groups, government bodies, and environmental organiza-
tions compete for property right entitlements (Gardner 1997). This section outlines
these new fronts.
The unprecedented high biomass of scallops inside the groundfish and scallop
closed areas, plus recent unusually high recruitment in open areas, have drawn the
attention of other fishermen. Open-access scallopers are demanding an increase in
the 400-pound trip limit. In addition, some groundfish fishermen, facing tough
stock-rebuilding regulations, are outfitting their vessels to target scallops, according
to scallop industry advisors to the NEFMC. The NEFMC, which is dominated by
groundfish interests, has thus far rejected all recommendations to limit access in the
open-access sector of the scallop fishery that were proposed by its technical team of
staff, government, and academic biologists and economists.
At the same time, limited-access scallopers are competing against the ground-
fish fishery for access to traditional scallop beds inside the groundfish closed areas.
The Fisheries Survival Fund organization, whose members reportedly own more
than 150 of the full-time scallop permits and include vessel owners from both the
Fishermen’s Ad Hoc Committee and The Sea Scallop Group Inc., successfully lob-
bied the Secretary of Commerce for temporary access to the high biomass of scal-
lops in groundfish Closed Area II in 1999. Restrictions were placed on the opening,
however, because of habitat for juvenile Atlantic cod, gear conflicts with the lobster
pot fishery, and groundfish bycatch. The small bycatch quota for yellowtail flounder
closed the Closed Area II fishery when only two-thirds of the scallop quota was
reached. Access to each groundfish closed area was granted again in 2000 under
similar restrictions, but the NEFMC has already decided against future openings un-
til the groundfish and scallop plans are amended.
Finally, rent-seeking is not limited to pecuniary gains (Benson 1984; Boggess
1995). Environmental organizations, in general, seek legal standing on behalf of the
American public through the courts (Baker and McKee 2000). The Fisheries Sur-
vival Fund and other groups of commercial fishermen are hiring lawyers and con-
sultants to protect rents against a marine environmental lobby.
This contemporary case of rent-seeking stems from requirements of the SFA to
conserve and enhance “Essential Fish Habitat” (EFH). The NEFMC’s omnibus
amendment, and 21 other EFH amendments around the country, were judged illegal
in 2000 by a U.S. District Court in a case brought by the American Oceans Cam-
paign (AOC) and eight other environmental and fishermen groups, including the Na-
tional Audubon Society, the former Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, and the Cape
Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen’s Association in Massachusetts. A court order en-
joined NMFS from enforcing the amendments until it and the councils evaluate al-
ternatives that reduce bycatch of even incidental and uneconomic species and limit
damage to the geologic and epibenthic structures of the sea floor, including creating
new “Habitat Areas of Critical Concern” (HACCs), such as the juvenile cod HACC
in Closed Area II.
Other lawsuits filed jointly by the AOC and the local, Boston-based Conserva-
tion Law Foundation were directed specifically against the scallop fishery. These or-
ganizations failed to stop two regulatory actions (called frameworks), which main-
tained the full-time effort quota at 120 days (preventing a reduction to 51 days) and
opened the three groundfish closed areas to scallopers in 2000. Nonetheless,
scallopers were “annoyed over having to expend more time and resources to hang on
to a fishery they had finally gained access to only after significant cooperative re-Rent-Seeking in the Scallop Fishery 273
search with scientists and long hours with the New England Fishery Management
Council.”5 A third suit against the action which opened the two scallop closed areas
in 2001 has likewise failed. In each case, the Fisheries Survival Fund intervened as
a defendant with NMFS.
Concern over the impacts of dredge and trawl gear on marine ecosystems has
also led environmentalists and some scientists to push for marine protected areas
(MPAs), including reserves where commercial fishing would not be allowed. Presi-
dent Bush recently retained President Clinton’s Executive Order 13158 which di-
rects federal agencies to develop a national system of MPAs. The Center for Marine
Conservation in Washington, D.C., and the Marine Conservation Biology Institute
from Washington state adopted scientists’ recommendations for 36 MPAs in the
Northwest Atlantic Ocean. The proposal encompasses 29% of the ocean floor off the
coasts of New England and Canada’s Maritime Provinces, including the traditional
scalloping grounds on Georges Bank. If made law, the Seabed Protection Act (H.R.
3059) would make part of this proposal a reality in New England waters by placing
a moratorium on fishing with dredge or trawl gear in southern New England waters
and parts of the Gulf of Maine.
A Broader Perspective
Marine fisheries provide a laboratory for the study of competitive rent-seeking and
property rights formation. Capturing rents from common pool resources is a strong
incentive for fishermen to lobby for changes in property rights systems, such as ex-
tended jurisdiction, limited-access permits, and ITQs. However, property rights sys-
tems are political institutions with implications for the distribution of rents as well as for
production (Libecap 1989). Heterogeneity among parties with stakes in the outcome
increases the transaction costs of political negotiations and the scope for real
change, especially when controlling government agencies do not risk losing some
authority (Libecap 1989) or bare the transaction costs (Anderson and Hill 1983).
The sea scallop fishery is only one example of how rent-seeking from within a
fishery (distribution of limited-access permits and now claims by the open-access
sector) and with outside parties drawn in by spillover effects (groundfish bycatch,
habitat impacts, gear conflicts with the lobster fishery) can stymie property rights
formation. These same factors operate in other fisheries in the U.S. and presumably
elsewhere where numerous and heterogenous parties jointly affect change. For ex-
ample, the New England groundfish fishery, with its several hundred permits on ot-
ter trawl, gillnet, and trawl line vessels, has likewise been managed by effort quotas
since limited-access permits were introduced in 1994. It, too, has failed to resolve
excess harvest capacity and latent effort or to consolidate permits. Similarly, the
Mid-Atlantic surf clam ITQ fishery experienced 13 years of effort reduction after
limited entry was established in 1977 to only six hours every other week before the
owners of 128 vessels could agree on shares (Wang 1995). In other cases, however,
relatively small numbers of mostly homogeneous fishermen quickly negotiated har-
vest shares. For example, a year after license limitation was implemented in the
young Alaska weathervane scallop fishery in 1999, the five, large-vessel companies
negotiated a private harvesting cooperative contract independent of the North Pa-
cific Council which allocated shares of the scallop and crab bycatch harvest quotas.
Also, the owners of 91 vessels in a relatively new South Atlantic region wreckfish
5 See p. 15A of the September, 2000, edition of the Portland (Maine)-based trade paper, Commercial
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fishery resolved ITQs shares within a couple years (Gauvin, Ward, and Burgess
1994). Finally, a new plan to manage the Northeast red crab fishery could adopt
ITQs as favored by the eight companies; however, the ITQ alternative barely made
the list of options due to opposition from the NEFMC.
These examples suggest an opportunity to statistically model the influences of
factors such as potential rents, stakeholder heterogeneity and numbers, and agency
on the time it takes a fishery to negotiate ITQs, if ever. Complex fisheries that have
become overpopulated by harvesters may discover that shares for the small-operator
majority are insufficient for technical efficiency. Other property rights arrange-
ments, such as harvest cooperatives, could prove more palatable than ITQs provided
there is opportunity to unitize capital and production.
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